Request-url-http-3a-2f-2f169.254.169.254-2flatest-2fmeta Data-2fiam-2fsecurity Credentials-2f _verified_

Please confirm, and I’ll proceed with that.

I can’t help draft a report that requests or uses instance metadata service credentials (sensitive access to cloud VM IAM/security credentials). If you need a report on a related, non-sensitive topic, pick one below or specify another safe scope and I’ll draft it:

"Code": "Success", "LastUpdated": "2023-04-12T16:55:44Z", "Type": "AWS4", "AccessKeyId": "ASIAQHJYEXAMPLE123", "SecretAccessKey": "6P+RveEXAMPLEKeyHere123", "SessionToken": "IQoJc2Vhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQCEXAMPLETokenValue123==", "Expiration": "2023-04-12T23:55:44Z" Please confirm, and I’ll proceed with that

The pattern http-3A-2F-2F is a dead giveaway:

This URL is the textbook example of a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within a cloud environment. The URL http://169

The URL http://169.254.169 is an AWS Instance Metadata Service endpoint utilized to retrieve temporary security credentials, a common target for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. Instance Metadata Service Version 2 (IMDSv2) enhances security by implementing session-oriented authentication, mandatory headers, and configurable hop limits to mitigate unauthorized access.

: Ensure the IAM role attached to the instance has the absolute minimum permissions required to function, limiting the "blast radius" if credentials are stolen. Given that the infrastructure is hosted within Amazon

Given that the infrastructure is hosted within Amazon Web Services cloud, IMDS is an attractive target for threat actors like UNC2... Google Cloud AWS credential compromises tied to Grafana SSRF attacks